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Abstract  
The significance of quality of life factors in end of life decisions cannot be 
overstressed. However, a plethora of case law shows that there are other factors 
which must be considered. The landmark cases of W v M and Others1 and Airedale 
N.H.S Trust v Bland2 indicate that autonomy and best interests of the patient must 
be given adequate consideration before making end of life decisions. The courts held 
that despite M’s minimally conscious state, dying was not in her best interests. 
However, in Bland where he had been in a persistent vegetative state, it was held 
that it was lawful for treatment to be withdrawn. This article gives a critical 
assessment of the disparities in both decisions and, with the aid of other case law, 
examines the extent to which quality of life factors have influenced the decisions of 
the courts. Furthermore, it argues whether patient autonomy should override best 
interests and then concludes that quality of life factors should influence end of life 
decisions to the extent of the patient’s autonomy or self-determination.  In other 
words, quality of life factors must be considered but respect for patient autonomy 
should be paramount.  
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Introduction 
At the very core of human existence is the notion of life and death. Every living soul 
will die at some point. As ubiquitous and inevitable as this may seem, it is not 
surprising that a lot of people avoid the topic especially when death could be said to 
be distant. Death is feared for a plethora of reasons amongst which it signifies the 
end of one’s existence, we bid farewell to our loved ones and everything we hold 
dear. Although it is impossible to alter the course of nature, the world of medicine 
has somehow managed to prolong lives artificially thanks to technological 
advancement. This has led to numerous ethical issues arising from making end of 
life decisions. For the purposes of this article, focus will be on people with disorders 
of consciousness (DOC), who lack capacity such as coma, permanent or persistent 
vegetative state (PVS) and the subsequently introduced minimally conscious state 
(MCS). End of life decisions include, but are not limited to, how one chooses to die, 
when to die, who should make the decision, whether or not life-saving treatment and 
medical support should be continued or withdrawn and the factors to be considered 
in making the decision. 
 
Sanctity of Life vs Quality of Life 
The concept of the sanctity of life stems from the fact that life is precious and ought 
to be preserved at all costs. The source of this notion remains unknown and unclear 
as there is a wide misconception that it is nothing but a strict prohibition on 
euthanasia and physician-assisted suicide.3 The concept has a religious undertone 
of life belonging to deity that should therefore not be deliberately taken. The majority 
of religions practised today recognise the principle of sanctity of life. Orthodox 
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Christians follow the commandment in the Bible which says “thou shall not kill.”4 
Muslims believe that life is from Allah and only He can determine when a person is to 
die. Buddhists are not explicit on their perception of voluntary and non-voluntary 
euthanasia but they are clearly against involuntary euthanasia.5 The principle is also 
supported by people with no religious references, who just believe that life is 
intrinsically valuable, and nature should be allowed to take its course in end of life 
decisions. Despite their strict adherence to sanctity of life, most religions recognise 
the doctrine of double effect i.e. they understand that in some cases, death could be 
a side effect of a good act such as alleviating pain and suffering. 6 It could therefore 
be argued that the lack of clarity on their positions proves that some religious 
opinions are a consensus subject to change.  
If life is indeed intrinsically valuable regardless of one’s state, does that make 
the sanctity of life principle an absolute right by itself? What then happens in a 
situation where life is not worthwhile at all?  Should this principle still stand when 
quality of life is low? The concept of quality of life holds that some lives are not worth 
living and that it is therefore right to end them.7 Peter Singer, a proponent of the 
utilitarian approach, opines that not all lives are worth living, some are of more value 
than others. Patients who have lost consciousness for instance and are unable to 
relate with others are not ‘living.’8 According to Maslow’s hierarchy of needs, our 
basic human needs from highest to lowest are self-actualization, esteem, love, safety 
and physiological needs i.e. the requirements for survival.9 Terminally ill patients, 
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especially those with disorders of consciousness, clearly have a low quality of life 
based on this theory. They are usually strapped to ventilators, have to undergo 
artificial nutrition and hydration, have no personal freedom, and in most cases they 
are unable to communicate. Despite these facts, supporters of sanctity of life argue 
that being alive albeit in a moribund state is better than no life at all. The courts also 
recognise the principle of sanctity of life but agree it is not always binding. As stated 
by Lord Goff in Bland, ‘..but this principle fundamental as it is, it is not absolute.’10 
The contentious decision in W v M is a major reference point for the quality and 
sanctity of life debate.  
In W v M,11 M suffered viral encephalitis with irreparable brain damage which 
rendered her in what initially seemed to be a permanent vegetative state. However, it 
was subsequently confirmed that she was in fact minimally conscious, a state above 
the vegetative state. The applicant, M’s mother sought a declaration from the court 
that M lacked capacity to make decisions on future treatment and a further 
declaration that the life-sustaining treatment and medical support including Artificial 
Nutrition and Hydration (ANH) could legally be removed. The substantive issue 
before the court was whether it was in M’s best interests for life-sustaining treatment, 
including ANH, to be withdrawn or withheld. Lord Baker J who was the presiding 
judge recognised her low quality of life but found preserving her life to be in her best 
interests.12 He held that in the absence of a formal advance direction, the issue had 
to be determined by the best interests test. He heard evidence of her initial 
autonomous wishes when she had capacity but he refused the application to 
withdraw ANH holding that: 
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M does experience pain and discomfort …however I find that she does 
have some positive experiences and importantly there is a reasonable 
prospect that those experiences can be extended by a planned 
programme of increased simulation.13  
 
Lord Baker J’s balance sheet approach weighs all the benefits and burdens of 
a decision against each other before determining what is in a patient’s best interests. 
The trend in the courts however mostly leans toward a ‘very strong presumption’ on 
the preservation of life.14  On one hand this approach was appropriate because life in 
itself is characterised by varying degrees of pleasure and pain. On the other hand, it 
is not without its faults; although M could feel pleasure and pain, the fact that she 
had a low quality of life was uncontentious. If she did in fact feel those emotions, 
which was paramount between pleasure and pain? Neither the assessment tools nor 
the Judge could determine this and therefore Lord Baker J erred in assessing the 
situation that way. His approach will only give a precise answer where the patient’s 
clinical condition and quality of life are either ‘demonstrably satisfactory or 
overwhelmingly burdensome.’15 In my opinion, good quality of life transcends being 
able to appreciate the sun and some pleasures. There is a dire need for social 
interaction and personal freedom in every human being and being in a minimally 
conscious state falls below that standard. Furthermore, there was enough evidence 
to show that M would have detested being in such deplorable state. Yet, there was 
no evidence of Bland’s previous wishes but treatment was withdrawn anyway. 
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In Bland, 17-year-old Anthony Bland was diagnosed as suffering from PVS as 
a result of his injuries following the disaster at the Hillsborough Football Stadium. He 
had been in a coma for three years and both his family and medical team sought a 
declaration that it was lawful to withdraw treatment and ANH. The courts established 
that life sustaining treatment had ceased to be in his best interests and a declaration 
was granted.16 This decision raises a number of ethico-legal issues on euthanasia 
and assisted suicide, but this paper will only address the factors considered in 
making the decision to grant a declaration. As is the case with MCS patients, those 
suffering from PVS are technically still alive as they are not immobile and retain 
some cranial nerve and spinal reflexes. Most importantly they are not brain dead.17  
Lord Hoffman described Bland’s life as being below that of the ‘most pitifully 
handicapped.’18 There was an interplay between best interests and quality of life in 
deciding this case. Lord Keith emphasised the unbinding nature of the sanctity of life 
principle and Lord Goff explained the importance of differentiating situations where 
prolonging life is not in the patient’s best interests due to the illegality of procedure 
and situations where life sustaining treatment is not in the patient’s best interests 
because it is futile as in Bland.19  
Lord Mustill’s persuasive argument was that neither termination of life nor 
continuation of treatment was in Bland’s best interests because death was inevitable 
and the doctor no longer had a duty to prolong life.20 His relatives also had no 
evidence of his precedent autonomous wishes which is understandable considering 
death and dying are not popular topics of discussion among adolescents.21 However 
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his father was certain his son would not want to be left in that state. Singer explains 
that when a patient becomes irreversibly unconscious, life stops being of benefit.22 
He also suggests that we go back to the traditional definition of death being the 
seizure of circulation of blood instead of brain stem death.23 I disagree with this 
proposition on the basis that patients who are not brain stem dead are still alive and 
may enjoy some benefits such as some level of environmental awareness and a 
chance for recovery where possible.  
The decisions in Bland and W v M raise the question of whether a distinction 
should in fact be made between PVS and MCS. In distinguishing M from PVS 
patients, she was said to be “recognisably alive in a way that a patient in the 
vegetative state is not.”24 Diagnosis of the MCS is not as straightforward as PVS 
owing to the varying degree of sensation and there is evidence of a potential 
increase in the rate of erroneous diagnosis of patients with DOC.25 However, 
patients in both categories are so severely impaired that they are unable to carry out 
daily living activities (low quality of life).26 Mullock in his commentary on W v M 
explains that there were other cases before Bland where the patients were above the 
permanent vegetative state but treatment was withdrawn anyway.27 He cites 
Frenchchay HealthCare Trust v S28 and Re H (Adult: Incompetent)29 as examples.  
These cases indicate the attitude of the courts toward people presumed to be 
PVS patients and Lord Baker’s dictum in W v M concerning the courts’ proclivity 
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toward granting the requests of PVS patients seeking termination of treatment 
corroborates this.30 PVS patients seeking termination of treatment garner support 
from the courts but in M’s case, the need to prolong life suddenly became prevalent. 
This inconsistency is evidence of the court’s bias towards PVS patients. This bias is 
also present in the European Court of Human Rights as seen in Lambert v France.31 
A possible counter argument is that the courts see MCS cases as more hopeful 
since recovery is not impossible. However, in severe cases such as M’s, recovery is 
rather implausible.  
Sheather makes a distinction between both categories based on the 
definitions of personal and biological deaths.32 According to him, MCS patients are 
biologically alive but personally dead due to the absence of their cognitive and 
psychological capacities while PVS patients are dead on both counts.33 This 
distinction is grounded on technicalities with no substantial evidence. Being alive 
personally and biologically is the essence of living; one without the other equates to 
low quality of life. Ashwal and Cranford’s claim that the MCS is in fact worse than the 
PVS stretches the argument beyond the need for a distinction.34 I agree to a large 
extent because a MCS patient could be in a more distressed state due to the 
intermittent nature of consciousness and inability to communicate.35 It is essentially 
being confined to the prison of one’s body and being aware. PVS patients on the 
other hand are completely oblivious, have little to no chance of recovery and are 
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“beyond suffering.”36  Therefore, a distinction should not have been made between 
Bland and W v M; treatment was futile in both cases.  
Supporters of the principle of sanctity of life emphasize the importance of 
palliative care.37 I agree with the logic behind this in that patients could be so well 
taken care of that there would be no desire for assisted suicide. For instance, 
Purdy38 and Daniel James39 may not have requested assisted suicide if there had 
been better palliative care. This argument can however be refuted by the inability of 
palliative care to eradicate the helpless and mental anguish that patients with DOC 
feel.40 The idea behind death with dignity for most is dying without being a burden to 
their loved ones and the best palliative care may not be able to allay this concern. 
Hence, respect for autonomy should be paramount.  
Neither the sanctity nor quality of life principle is sufficient to justify end of life 
decisions. Sanctity of life is limited in scope and therefore should not be imposed on 
others. Furthermore, it can be displaced by the doctrines of double effect and 
necessity. Patients with disorders of consciousness with no hope of recovery are as 
good as dead and dying is not always necessarily bad. Sometimes ending a patient’s 
life could be in their best interests as seen in Bland. Lady Hale in Aintree University 
Hospital v James41 with the application of Bland suggests that it is wrong to ask 
whether it was in the patient’s best interests to die. Instead the question to be asked 
is whether it is in the patient’s best interests to receive treatment.42 Doing this shifts 
the focus from the patient’s death to the futility or non-futility of treatment and as Lord 
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Baker J states concerning sanctity in Gloucestershire Clinical Commissioning Group 
v AB,43 the principle ‘does not impose an obligation to provide treatment where life is 
futile.’44  
A major shortcoming of the quality of life principle is its vagueness. It raises 
some unresolvable questions such as, how much suffering and pain is too much? At 
what stage should life be terminated? Also, lifestyles differ, hence what may be 
perceived as unbearable to one person may be manageable by another. Therefore, 
merely assessing what is perceived to be the quality of life is not sufficient. When 
dealing with relative issues such as how a person wishes to die, it is important for 
one’s individuality to be taken into consideration. Consider the kind of life the patient 
has led. What would they have wanted? Daniel James was only paralysed but went 
to Dignitas anyway because he could not bear living that way.45 Chan and Tipoe 
argue that denying a patient in a MCS life-sustaining treatment on grounds of low 
quality of life ‘represents grave discrimination against disabled persons.’46 This logic 
is fundamentally flawed because minimal consciousness is a severe form of 
disability and categorising all disabled people into one class is the actual 
discrimination. Disabled people are able to lead normal and healthy lives and their 
quality of life may not be necessarily low. This is however subject to an individual’s 
perception of a good quality of life. With MCS patients, quality of life factors may or 
not lead to the termination of treatment. It is a question of whether the benefits of 
being kept alive outweigh the burden.47 
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Should Best Interests Override Patient Autonomy? 
As stated by Lord Mustill in Bland, doctors must comply with a competent adult’s 
refusal of life-sustaining medical treatment.48 The Mental Capacity Act 2005 requires 
doctors to comply with any applicable advance decision on refusal of life-sustaining 
treatment.49 In the absence of this, actions taken on behalf of patients who lack 
capacity must be done in their best interests.50 Concerning life-sustaining treatment, 
it provides that there must be no desire to bring about death.51 Medical law cases 
are dealt with based on the merits of each case therefore it would be unreasonable 
to suggest that best interests should always override patient autonomy or vice versa. 
However, this paper argues that there are instances where one could be more 
prevalent than the other. Patient autonomy should override best interests where 
there is evidence of precedent autonomous wishes of the patient as seen in W v M. 
The law recognises the need to take into account the patient’s previous wishes in 
determining their best interests but the weight to be attached to such wishes 
depends on the facts of each case.  
Arguments for the continuation of M’s treatment based on the best interests 
approach include a better chance of recovery than PVS patients. Recovery is not 
impossible in a MCS according to the research carried out by Bruno and others.52 
However as already established, this was not the case in M’s situation.  Another 
reason given is that MCS patients enjoy the benefits of some environmental 
awareness and in M’s case she was responsive.53 This argument cuts both ways; 
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M’s responses could have been indicative of either pleasure or pain, discomfort and 
distress.54 Demertzi and others explain the difficulty in assessing the gravity of the 
pain and the level of awareness of minimally conscious patients in their European 
survey of medical and paramedical professionals.55 This explains this paper’s 
criticism of decisions made solely on the best interests approach. No one can really 
know how much pain a person is in except that person.  
Furthermore, the prognosis of physicians and carers is not always reliable as 
their judgements may be clouded by their attachment and closeness to the patient. 
Therefore, in M the courts gave too much consideration to evidence from carers. It 
should be noted that the decision to allow a loved one to die is not whimsical. 
Therefore, one would imagine M’s relatives were indeed genuine about M’s 
presumed wishes. Evidence of what a patient would have wanted should be 
differentiated from wishes of third parties such as parents as seen in Re A (A 
Child).56  This is not a proposition for a blanket denial of life-sustaining treatment for 
MCS patients. The best interests test is case specific; therefore my argument is that 
courts should respect and obey precedent autonomous wishes of patients who lack 
capacity. M’s case was at the extreme end of the spectrum and there was enough 
evidence to suggest that she would have wanted a more dignified death.  
Best interests should override autonomy in the withdrawal or withholding of 
treatment in children. Parents are expected to make end of life decisions for their 
children, however where there is a disagreement on the appropriate line of action 
between parents and doctors, the courts intervene and such a child becomes a ward 
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of the court.  In Re A (Conjoined Twins)57, the bone of contention was whether to 
separate the twins and enable only one of them survive or keep them conjoined 
which would result in their inevitable deaths.58 The parents opted for the latter 
alternative based on their religious beliefs founded on the principle of sanctity of life. 
Mary’s quality of life was considerably lower than Jodie’s and from a medical 
standpoint, she had no chance of survival with or without separation. In lay terms, 
the courts had to choose the lesser of two evils.  
The courts’ paramount consideration was the best interests of the children 
with Lord Brooke establishing that the case satisfied all requirements for the 
application of the doctrine of necessity i.e. preserving Jodie’s life would have a 
greater utilitarian value than that of Mary’s.59 They referred to other principles such 
as bioethics, Kantian theory, virtue ethics, utilitarian principle, non-maleficence 
amongst others. This indicates the onerous nature of end of life decisions. Although 
the children’s best interests were irreconcilable, Lord Walker J’s opinion which I 
agree with was that the surgery was in their best interests and that the operation 
would give Mary ‘bodily integrity as a human being even in death.’60 The operation 
was carried out and Jodie lives on till date. If the courts had obeyed the wishes of 
her parents, she would have been denied the life she now enjoys. 61  
Another case where the courts rightly chose best interests over parental 
autonomy was Re A ( A Child).62  In this case, the patient had been declared 
clinically dead following brain stem death. The parents objected to the turning off of 
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the ventilator based on religious beliefs. Coroner sought for a declaration to be 
granted jurisdiction over child’s body. Declaration was granted.63 This decision was 
obvious as there was really no quality of life to be considered. Therefore, the 
parents’ insistence of continuation of treatment was futile.  This paper is not 
suggesting a denial of the right of parents to make end of life decisions for their 
children. However, these two cases exemplify the difficulty in ascertaining 
objectiveness in parents. Religious sentiments ought to be respected but when 
dealing with life and death issues, other factors especially best interests must be 
given more consideration.  
There is undoubtedly the question of whether this gives the courts too much 
power over another person’s child. This could be true because the courts unarguably 
usurp the responsibility of the parents but they are also in a better position to 
determine what the best interests are. They are not emotionally involved, therefore 
they are more clear minded and objective. This position is not as clear cut in the 
case of post-mortem pregnancy where the mother has expressed her wishes not to 
be kept alive and the foetus is viable. The courts will have to weigh the competing 
interests of mother and foetus.64 Personhood and other factors outside the scope of 
this paper are to be considered in determining the appropriate line of action. The 
limitation to the best interests test is the varying margin of interpretation of best 
interests. Responses given by MCS patients for instance may be interpreted 
narrowly as was done by Lord Baker in M or based on a wider consideration of 
issues.65  
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Moving beyond the argument of autonomy overriding best interests and vice 
versa, it should be noted that autonomy is not an absolute right. Dying is not an 
individual matter; it involves the family members as well as the healthcare providers, 
thereby limiting the autonomy of the patient. Physicians are trained not to readily 
give up on their patients and any form of response may be a glimmer of hope. 
Furthermore, a patient’s previous wishes when there was capacity may have 
changed after capacity is lost. There is an emergence of new priorities; therefore 
Lord Baker’s assessment of M’s situation was not entirely wrong.66  This limitation, 
although disguised as benevolent paternalism, is also present in the autonomy of 
competent patients as seen in the case of Mrs B.67 Another limitation to autonomy is 
the need to seek declaration about proposed withdrawal and withholding of ANH 
from PVS and MCS patients according to the Practice Direction under the Court of 
Protection Rules 2007. It should however be noted that in MCS cases after Aintree,68 
in the absence of legally binding advance decisions, more weight has been given to 
family’s views on what the patient would have wanted. 69  
 
The Role of Advance Directives 
The importance of terminally ill patients having advance decisions about treatment 
cannot be overemphasised because it is autonomous and legally binding. M’s case 
would not have been so controversial and her autonomy would have been respected 
if she had it. However, there are limits to the application of advance decisions. They 
do not envisage all situations and there is usually no adequate consideration before 
decision is made. Therefore, they are not always reliable and hence, the need to 
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respect patient autonomy. In lieu of this, I agree with Johnson’s proposition that 
surrogate decision makers be appointed.70  
 
Conclusion 
As asserted in this article, quality of life factors must be considered in end of life 
decisions but autonomy should be given more weight. The duty of the courts to 
prolong life should not override their legal obligation to respect autonomy.71 This is 
not suggesting that physicians blindly follow the wishes of the patient. They still have 
a duty to treat patients in their best interests. However, in cases where level of 
sensation is unascertainable such as the minimally conscious state, end of life 
decisions must be made upon respect for the patient’s previous wishes. The courts 
should not have made a distinction between W v M and Bland; treatment was futile 
in both cases. As with everything in life, change is constant. Although life stops being 
of benefit, patients adapt and begin to enjoy whatever benefits are derivable from a 
disorder of consciousness. Therefore, a patient’s previous wishes may change as a 
result of their current terminal situation and termination of life may not be the desired 
option.  
Kassim, Alias et al state the need for healthcare providers to discover the 
personal, religious and spiritual beliefs of patients concerning end of life issues.72 
This ensures collaborative decision making and less likelihood of misunderstanding 
and it also goes a long way in maintaining the doctor/patient relationship.73 If a 
terminally ill patient voluntarily decides that the suffering and pain is too much and 
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wish to end their life, it is not the right of the law or physician to decide otherwise. As 
established in this paper, neither quality of life nor sanctity of life considerations are 
sufficient to justify end of life decisions and according to Mullock:  
 
the legal requirement to consider the past wishes and views of 
incompetent patients should not be seen as an opportunity for the 
judiciary to choose either autonomy or sanctity, but rather an obligation 
to respect autonomy. 
